Who Is Osama Bin Laden?
by Michel Chossudovsky |
Professor of Economics, University of Ottawa
Centre for Research on Globalisation (CRG), Montréal Posted at
12 September 2001
A few hours after the terrorist attacks on the
World Trade Centre and the Pentagon, the Bush administration concluded without
supporting evidence, that "Osama bin Laden and his al-Qaeda organisation
were prime suspects". CIA Director George Tenet stated that bin Laden has
the capacity to plan ``multiple attacks with little or no warning.'' Secretary
of State Colin Powell called the attacks "an act of war" and President
Bush confirmed in an evening televised address to the Nation that he would
"make no distinction between the terrorists who committed these acts and
those who harbor them". Former CIA Director James Woolsey pointed his
finger at "state sponsorship," implying the complicity of one or more
foreign governments. In the words of former National Security Adviser, Lawrence
Eagleburger, "I think we will show when we get attacked like this, we are
terrible in our strength and in our retribution."
Meanwhile, parroting official statements, the
Western media mantra has approved the launching of "punitive actions"
directed against civilian targets in the Middle East. In the words of William
Saffire writing in the New York Times: "When we reasonably determine our
attackers' bases and camps, we must pulverize them -- minimizing but accepting
the Risk of collateral damage" -- and act overtly or covertly to
destabilize terror's national hosts".
The following text outlines the history of
Osama Bin Laden and the links of the Islamic "Jihad" to the
formulation of US foreign policy during the Cold War and its aftermath.
Prime suspect in the New York and Washington terrorists
attacks, branded by the FBI as an "international terrorist" for his
role in the African US embassy bombings, Saudi born Osama bin Laden was
recruited during the Soviet-Afghan war "ironically under the auspices of
the CIA, to fight Soviet invaders". 1
In 1979 "the largest covert operation in the history of
the CIA" was launched in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in
support of the pro-Communist government of Babrak Kamal.2:
With the active encouragement of the CIA and Pakistan's ISI
[Inter Services Intelligence], who wanted to turn the Afghan jihad into a
global war waged by all Muslim states against the Soviet Union, some 35,000
Muslim radicals from 40 Islamic countries joined Afghanistan's fight between
1982 and 1992. Tens of thousands more came to study in Pakistani madrasahs.
Eventually more than 100,000 foreign Muslim radicals were directly influenced
by the Afghan jihad.3
The Islamic "jihad" was supported by the United
States and Saudi Arabia with a significant part of the funding generated from
the Golden Crescent drug trade:
In March 1985, President Reagan signed National Security
Decision Directive 166,...[which] authorize[d] stepped-up covert military aid
to the mujahideen, and it made clear that the secret Afghan war had a new
goal: to defeat Soviet troops in Afghanistan through covert action and
encourage a Soviet withdrawal. The new covert U.S. assistance began with a
dramatic increase in arms supplies -- a steady rise to 65,000 tons annually by
1987, ... as well as a "ceaseless stream" of CIA and Pentagon
specialists who traveled to the secret headquarters of Pakistan's ISI on the
main road near Rawalpindi, Pakistan. There the CIA specialists met with
Pakistani intelligence officers to help plan operations for the Afghan
The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) using Pakistan's
military Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) played a key role in training the
Mujahideen. In turn, the CIA sponsored guerrilla training was integrated with
the teachings of Islam:
Predominant themes were that Islam was a complete
socio-political ideology, that holy Islam was being violated by the atheistic
Soviet troops, and that the Islamic people of Afghanistan should reassert
their independence by overthrowing the leftist Afghan regime propped up by
Pakistan's Intelligence Apparatus
Pakistan's ISI was used as a "go-between". The CIA
covert support to the "jihad" operated indirectly through the
Pakistani ISI, --i.e. the CIA did not channel its support directly to the
Mujahideen. In other words, for these covert operations to be
"successful", Washington was careful not to reveal the ultimate
objective of the "jihad", which consisted in destroying the Soviet
In the words of CIA's Milton Beardman "We didn't train
Arabs". Yet according to Abdel Monam Saidali, of the Al-aram Center for
Strategic Studies in Cairo, bin Laden and the "Afghan Arabs" had been
imparted "with very sophisticated types of training that was allowed to
them by the CIA" 6
CIA's Beardman confirmed, in this regard, that Osama bin Laden
was not aware of the role he was playing on behalf of Washington. In the words
of bin Laden (quoted by Beardman): "neither I, nor my brothers saw evidence
of American help". 7
Motivated by nationalism and religious fervor, the Islamic
warriors were unaware that they were fighting the Soviet Army on behalf of Uncle
Sam. While there were contacts at the upper levels of the intelligence
hierarchy, Islamic rebel leaders in theatre had no contacts with Washington or
With CIA backing and the funneling of massive amounts of US
military aid, the Pakistani ISI had developed into a "parallel structure
wielding enormous power over all aspects of government". 8 The ISI had a
staff composed of military and intelligence officers, bureaucrats, undercover
agents and informers, estimated at 150,000. 9
Meanwhile, CIA operations had also reinforced the Pakistani
military regime led by General Zia Ul Haq:
'Relations between the CIA and the ISI [Pakistan's military
intelligence] had grown increasingly warm following [General] Zia's ouster of
Bhutto and the advent of the military regime,'... During most of the Afghan
war, Pakistan was more aggressively anti-Soviet than even the United States.
Soon after the Soviet military invaded Afghanistan in 1980, Zia [ul Haq] sent
his ISI chief to destabilize the Soviet Central Asian states. The CIA only
agreed to this plan in October 1984.... `the CIA was more cautious than the
Pakistanis.' Both Pakistan and the United States took the line of deception on
Afghanistan with a public posture of negotiating a settlement while privately
agreeing that military escalation was the best course.10
The Golden Crescent Drug Triangle
The history of the drug trade in Central Asia is intimately
related to the CIA's covert operations. Prior to the Soviet-Afghan war, opium
production in Afghanistan and Pakistan was directed to small regional markets.
There was no local production of heroin. 11 In this regard, Alfred McCoy's study
confirms that within two years of the onslaught of the CIA operation in
Afghanistan, "the Pakistan-Afghanistan borderlands became the world's top
heroin producer, supplying 60 percent of U.S. demand. In Pakistan, the
heroin-addict population went from near zero in 1979... to 1.2 million by 1985
-- a much steeper rise than in any other nation":12
CIA assets again controlled this heroin trade. As the
Mujahideen guerrillas seized territory inside Afghanistan, they ordered
peasants to plant opium as a revolutionary tax. Across the border in Pakistan,
Afghan leaders and local syndicates under the protection of Pakistan
Intelligence operated hundreds of heroin laboratories. During this decade of
wide-open drug-dealing, the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency in Islamabad failed
to instigate major seizures or arrests ... U.S. officials had refused to
investigate charges of heroin dealing by its Afghan allies `because U.S.
narcotics policy in Afghanistan has been subordinated to the war against
Soviet influence there.' In 1995, the former CIA director of the Afghan
operation, Charles Cogan, admitted the CIA had indeed sacrificed the drug war
to fight the Cold War. `Our main mission was to do as much damage as possible
to the Soviets. We didn't really have the resources or the time to devote to
an investigation of the drug trade,'... `I don't think that we need to
apologize for this. Every situation has its fallout.... There was fallout in
terms of drugs, yes. But the main objective was accomplished. The Soviets left
In the Wake of the Cold War
In the wake of the Cold War, the Central Asian region is not
only strategic for its extensive oil reserves, it also produces three quarters
of the World's opium representing multibillion dollar revenues to business
syndicates, financial institutions, intelligence agencies and organized crime.
The annual proceeds of the Golden Crescent drug trade (between 100 and 200
billion dollars) represents approximately one third of the Worldwide annual
turnover of narcotics, estimated by the United Nations to be of the order of
With the disintegration of the Soviet Union, a new surge in
opium production has unfolded. (According to UN estimates, the production of
opium in Afghanistan in 1998-99 -- coinciding with the build up of armed
insurgencies in the former Soviet republics-- reached a record high of 4600
metric tons.15 Powerful business syndicates in the former Soviet Union allied
with organized crime are competing for the strategic control over the heroin
The ISI's extensive intelligence military-network was not
dismantled in the wake of the Cold War. The CIA continued to support the Islamic
"jihad" out of Pakistan. New undercover initiatives were set in motion
in Central Asia, the Caucasus and the Balkans. Pakistan's military and
intelligence apparatus essentially "served as a catalyst for the
disintegration of the Soviet Union and the emergence of six new Muslim republics
in Central Asia." 16.
Meanwhile, Islamic missionaries of the Wahhabi sect from Saudi
Arabia had established themselves in the Muslim republics as well as within the
Russian federation encroaching upon the institutions of the secular State.
Despite its anti-American ideology, Islamic fundamentalism was largely serving
Washington's strategic interests in the former Soviet Union.
Following the withdrawal of Soviet troops in 1989, the civil
war in Afghanistan continued unabated. The Taliban were being supported by the
Pakistani Deobandis and their political party the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Islam (JUI).
In 1993, JUI entered the government coalition of Prime Minister Benazzir Bhutto.
Ties between JUI, the Army and ISI were established. In 1995, with the downfall
of the Hezb-I-Islami Hektmatyar government in Kabul, the Taliban not only
instated a hardline Islamic government, they also "handed control of
training camps in Afghanistan over to JUI factions..." 17
And the JUI with the support of the Saudi Wahhabi movements
played a key role in recruiting volunteers to fight in the Balkans and the
former Soviet Union.
Jane Defense Weekly confirms in this regard that "half of
Taliban manpower and equipment originate[d] in Pakistan under the ISI" 18
In fact, it would appear that following the Soviet withdrawal
both sides in the Afghan civil war continued to receive covert support through
Pakistan's ISI. 19
In other words, backed by Pakistan's military intelligence (ISI)
which in turn was controlled by the CIA, the Taliban Islamic State was largely
serving American geopolitical interests. The Golden Crescent drug trade was also
being used to finance and equip the Bosnian Muslim Army (starting in the early
1990s) and the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). In last few months there is
evidence that Mujahideen mercenaries are fighting in the ranks of KLA-NLA
terrorists in their assaults into Macedonia.
No doubt, this explains why Washington has closed its eyes on
the reign of terror imposed by the Taliban including the blatant derogation of
women's rights, the closing down of schools for girls, the dismissal of women
employees from government offices and the enforcement of "the Sharia laws
The War in Chechnya
With regard to Chechnya, the main rebel leaders Shamil Basayev
and Al Khattab were trained and indoctrinated in CIA sponsored camps in
Afghanistan and Pakistan. According to Yossef Bodansky, director of the U.S.
Congress's Task Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare, the war in
Chechnya had been planned during a secret summit of HizbAllah
in 1996 in Mogadishu, Somalia. 21 The summit, was attended by Osama bin Laden
and high-ranking Iranian and Pakistani intelligence officers. In this regard,
the involvement of Pakistan's ISI in Chechnya "goes far beyond supplying
the Chechens with weapons and expertise: the ISI and its radical Islamic proxies
are actually calling the shots in this war". 22
Russia's main pipeline route transits through Chechnya and
Dagestan. Despite Washington's perfunctory condemnation of Islamic terrorism,
the indirect beneficiaries of the Chechen war are the Anglo-American oil
conglomerates which are vying for control over oil resources and pipeline
corridors out of the Caspian Sea basin.
The two main Chechen rebel armies (respectively led by
Commander Shamil Basayev and Emir Khattab) estimated at 35,000 strong were
supported by Pakistan's ISI, which also played a key role in organizing and
training the Chechen rebel army:
[In 1994] the Pakistani Inter Services Intelligence arranged
for Basayev and his trusted lieutenants to undergo intensive Islamic
indoctrination and training in guerrilla warfare in the Khost province of
Afghanistan at Amir Muawia camp, set up in the early 1980s by the CIA and ISI
and run by famous Afghani warlord Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. In July 1994, upon
graduating from Amir Muawia, Basayev was transferred to Markaz-i-Dawar camp in
Pakistan to undergo training in advanced guerrilla tactics. In Pakistan,
Basayev met the highest ranking Pakistani military and intelligence officers:
Minister of Defense General Aftab Shahban Mirani, Minister of Interior General
Naserullah Babar, and the head of the ISI branch in charge of supporting
Islamic causes, General Javed Ashraf, (all now retired). High-level
connections soon proved very useful to Basayev.23
Following his training and indoctrination stint, Basayev was
assigned to lead the assault against Russian federal troops in the first Chechen
war in 1995. His organization had also developed extensive links to criminal
syndicates in Moscow as well as ties to Albanian organized crime and the Kosovo
Liberation Army (KLA). In 1997-98, according to Russia's Federal Security
Service (FSB) "Chechen warlords started buying up real estate in Kosovo...
through several real estate firms registered as a cover in Yugoslavia" 24
Basayev's organisation has also been involved in a number of
rackets including narcotics, illegal tapping and sabotage of Russia's oil
pipelines, kidnapping, prostitution, trade in counterfeit dollars and the
smuggling of nuclear materials (See Mafia linked to Albania's collapsed
pyramids, 25 Alongside the extensive laundering of drug money, the proceeds of
various illicit activities have been funneled towards the recruitment of
mercenaries and the purchase of weapons.
During his training in Afghanistan, Shamil Basayev linked up
with Saudi born veteran Mujahideen Commander "Al Khattab" who had
fought as a volunteer in Afghanistan. Barely a few months after Basayev's return
to Grozny, Khattab was invited (early 1995) to set up an army base in Chechnya
for the training of Mujahideen fighters. According to the BBC, Khattab's posting
to Chechnya had been "arranged through the Saudi-Arabian based
[International] Islamic Relief Organisation, a militant religious organisation,
funded by mosques and rich individuals which channeled funds into
Since the Cold War era, Washington has consciously supported
Osama bin Laden, while at same time placing him on the FBI's "most wanted
list" as the World's foremost terrorist.
While the Mujahideen are busy fighting America's war in the
Balkans and the former Soviet Union, the FBI --operating as a US based Police
Force- is waging a domestic war against terrorism, operating in some respects
independently of the CIA which has --since the Soviet-Afghan war-- supported
international terrorism through its covert operations.
In a cruel irony, while the Islamic jihad --featured by the
Bush Adminstration as "a threat to America"-- is blamed for the
terrorist assaults on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon, these same
Islamic organisations constitute a key instrument of US military-intelligence
operations in the Balkans and the former Soviet Union.
In the wake of the terrorist attacks in New York and
Washington, the truth must prevail to prevent the Bush Adminstration together
with its NATO partners from embarking upon a military adventure which threatens
the future of humanity.
Hugh Davies, International: `Informers' point the finger at
bin Laden; Washington on alert for suicide bombers, The Daily Telegraph,
London, 24 August 1998.
See Fred Halliday, "The Un-great game: the Country
that lost the Cold War, Afghanistan, New Republic, 25 March 1996):
Ahmed Rashid, The Taliban: Exporting Extremism, Foreign
Affairs, November-December 1999.
Steve Coll, Washington Post, July 19, 1992.
Dilip Hiro, Fallout from the Afghan Jihad, Inter Press
Services, 21 November 1995.
Weekend Sunday (NPR); Eric Weiner, Ted Clark; 16 August
Dipankar Banerjee; Possible Connection of ISI With Drug
Industry, India Abroad, 2 December 1994.
See Diego Cordovez and Selig Harrison, Out of Afghanistan:
The Inside Story of the Soviet Withdrawal, Oxford university Press, New
York, 1995. See also the review of Cordovez and Harrison in International
Press Services, 22 August 1995.
Alfred McCoy, Drug fallout: the CIA's Forty Year Complicity
in the Narcotics Trade. The Progressive; 1 August 1997.
Douglas Keh, Drug Money in a changing World, Technical
document no 4, 1998, Vienna UNDCP, p. 4. See also Report of the
International Narcotics Control Board for 1999, E/INCB/1999/1 United Nations
Publication, Vienna 1999, p 49-51, And Richard Lapper, UN Fears Growth of
Heroin Trade, Financial Times, 24 February 2000.
Report of the International Narcotics Control Board, op
cit, p 49-51, see also Richard Lapper, op. cit.
International Press Services, 22 August 1995.
Ahmed Rashid, The Taliban: Exporting Extremism, Foreign
Affairs, November- December, 1999, p. 22.
Quoted in the Christian Science Monitor, 3 September 1998)
Tim McGirk, Kabul learns to live with its bearded
conquerors, The Independent, London, 6 November1996.
See K. Subrahmanyam, Pakistan is Pursuing Asian Goals,
India Abroad, 3 November 1995.
Levon Sevunts, Who's calling the shots?: Chechen conflict
finds Islamic roots in Afghanistan and Pakistan, 23 The Gazette, Montreal,
26 October 1999..
See Vitaly Romanov and Viktor Yadukha, Chechen Front Moves
To Kosovo Segodnia, Moscow, 23 Feb 2000.
The European, 13 February 1997, See also Itar-Tass, 4-5
BBC, 29 September 1999).
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